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Abstract
Does a central bank, when introducing a new monetary regime designed to reduce
inflation, prefer more or fewer economic agents who form informed forecasts of
inflation? The relevance of the question arises because the central bank can make a
decision about how much information to disseminate about the nature of the new regime.
We find that the central bank will prefer a higher proportion of agents who form rational
expectations if it disinflates from a high level of inflation but not so if it disinflates from a
moderate or low inflation level.
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A Disinflation Tradeoff: Speed versus Final Destination
1.

Introduction.
Whether or not expectations of inflation are rational is an open question. Rational

forecasts require knowledge and information that some agents may not find worthwhile
acquiring. Instead, since past inflation is a cheap and potentially informative signal about
the policies of the central bank, those agents with less information may resort to
extrapolation from past inflation to a greater extent than those with more information. In
other words, for all agents, expectations have a rational (forward-looking) and an
adaptive (backward-looking) component. Differences across agents in terms of
information can lead to a separation between those who form more rational and those
who form more adaptive expectations. 1
A simpler heterogeneity -- agents with purely rational or with purely adaptive
expectations -- has been adopted in some models. 2 In that context, when a central bank is
the major source of information about monetary policy, it could potentially influence the
proportion of agents in each group. A natural question is what are the central bank’s
preferences regarding the distribution. More specifically, does the central bank prefer
many or few agents with rational expectations when introducing a monetary regime
designed to reduce inflation?
We will analyze the properties of a Barro-Gordon (1983a) model of monetary
policy where some agents form rational and some adaptive expectations. In that setting, a
higher proportion of agents with adaptive expectations generally slows down the
1

The notion of “economically rational” expectations introduced by Feige and Pearce (1976) was further
examined theoretically by, for example, Sethi and Franke (1995), Crettez and Michel (1992), and
empirically by Baghestani (1992).
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disinflation process but, as in Sargent (1999), it also allows for a lower long-run inflation
rate. An implication of this is that the central bank will prefer a higher proportion of
agents who form rational expectations if it disinflates from a high level of inflation but
not so if it disinflates from a moderate or low inflation level.
It is generally recognized that expectations do not adjust instantaneously to reflect
the new conditions following a change in monetary regime. Instead, agents, including the
central bank, observe the unfolding macro developments and form estimates of the
parameters that characterize the new environment (Lewis, 1989, Wieland 2000, Mankiw,
et al., 1987). A number of interesting questions are addressed in that set-up. What is the
speed and correctness of learning? Can the central bank use its control over monetary
aggregates to generate observations useful in the learning process, i.e., can learning be an
active process? When does equilibrium have an inflationary bias?
The structure of our model is simpler in the sense that the central bank has direct
control over inflation and, aside from a random shock, the output response to changes in
prices is clear. The simpler set up make the model analytically tractable and allow us to
solve explicitly for steady-state inflation and a parameter that captures speed of
convergence of inflation to the steady state. We can compare our results with the
numerical estimates of other more complicated models, most notably Sargent’s (1999).
Our explicit solution helps clarify insights about the dynamics of disinflations.
Models of parameter uncertainty and learning have also addressed questions about
gradual versus rapid disinflation. With results similar to ours, Balvers and Cosimano
(1994) find that rapid disinflation is preferred when inflation is high although in their
2

See for example Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989).
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framework rapid reduction in money growth is warranted in order to facilitate learning. In
our model, rational agents are preferred since, with high initial inflation, the benefit from
rapid disinflation with more rational agents outweighs the cost of higher steady state
inflation.
Similar to Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Cosimano and Van Huyck (1993),
in our model there is a possibility for the central bank to influence the beliefs of the
population. The process of expectation formation however is not modeled formally,
which contributes substantially to the analytical tractability of the model. We assume that
the central bank can publicize its track record with inflation rather than the exact
mechanics of its monetary regime, or vice versa. In that way it can influence the relative
adaptive (backward-looking) and rational (forward-looking) components of expectations.
A brief discussion of our motivation may clarify our thinking about why a central bank
might want to influence agents’ expectations formation and how it can do so.
The motivation for the paper comes in part from observations of the behavior of
the central bank in Bulgaria, where a currency board was introduced on July 1, 1997. 3
Orthodox currency boards are fixed exchange-rate regimes that operate like a gold
standard except that central-bank reserves are kept in a foreign currency rather than gold.
Domestic money is convertible and a monetary aggregate, usually the monetary base, is
fully backed by foreign exchange reserves. The central bank, which manages the currency
board, has no responsibilities to react to unemployment and no discretionary authority
regarding the money supply. These features make a currency board a powerful
disinflation device for countries that have had high inflation. To facilitate beliefs that

3

disinflation will occur, the central bank will therefore have an incentive to actively
advertise what a currency board does.
Most currency boards, however, including the one in Bulgaria, are not entirely
orthodox. They have lender of last resort facilities or other features that allow some
monetary discretion. Therefore, in practice monetary discretion is limited but not
eliminated. If known to the public, these features may raise concerns and contribute to
higher expected inflation. It may therefore not be to the advantage of the central bank to
advertise all the details about its own currency board.
While a lot of news was disseminated in Bulgaria about the currency board at the
time of its introduction, there has not been as much public information since then about
how the board operates. The central bank has maintained instead that people should pay
attention to the track record with low inflation.4 In terms of our model, we will argue that
this pattern of behavior makes sense.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop the model with two
types of agents – those with adaptive expectations and those with rational expectations.
Section 3 discusses influences on the dynamics of the inflation process, with emphasis on
the effect of having more or fewer naïve agents. Section 4 addresses the issue of what
proportion of naïve agents the central bank will choose, if its actions can influence that
proportion. Section 5 concludes.

3

For a discussion of the history and operation of currency boards, see Williamson (1995) and Schwartz
(1993).
4
See Carlson and Valev (2000).
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2.

A model of monetary policy with heterogeneous agents.
Output yt (all variables in logarithms) differs from its natural level by an amount

determined by the real wage (wt-pt):
y t = y t − (wt − p t ) − u t

(1)

where ut is an i.i.d. supply shock with mean zero and variance σ2. A positive value of ut
represents a negative output shock.
Inflation πt is defined by:
π t = pt − pt −1

(2)

Agents are heterogeneous in the way they form expectations of inflation. A
proportion θ of all agents form adaptive expectations:
EtA−1π t = π t −1

(3)
which yields:

EtA−1 pt = pt −1 + π t −1

(4)

The remaining (1-θ) agents form rational expectations. Denote their expectations
of the price level by EtR−1 pt .
Before the shock ut has been observed, the nominal wage is set at the average
expected price:
(5)

wt = θ ( pt −1 + π t −1 ) + (1 − θ ) E tR−1 pt
Define the monetary authorities’ loss function Lt as:

(6)

Lt = [ yt − ~
yt ] + απ t2
2
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where ~yt is the level of output targeted by the policymaker. By substituting (5) into (1)
and (1) into (6), we write the loss function as:
L t = [π t - (1-θ)E t-1 π t - θπ t-1 - k t -u t ]2 + α π t 2

(7)

where E t −1π t = EtR−1 pt - p t-1 is expected inflation by agents with rational expectations and
kt = ~
y t − y t > 0 is the difference between the target and the natural level of output.

After observing the nominal wage and the shock ut, the government chooses
inflation πt to minimize:
∞

(8)

Vt =

∑β
i =0

i

E t Lt +i

where β∈[0,1]. Substitute from (7) into (8) and assume kt+i=k, for all i. The objective
can then be written:

min π t Vt = min π t {[π t − (1 − θ )E t −1π t − θπ t −1 − k − u t ] + απ t2 +
2

(8’)

∞

∞

+ ∑ β i E t [π t +i − (1 − θ )E t +i −1π t +i − θπ t +i −1 − k − u t +i ] + α ∑ β i E t π t2+i }
2

i =1

i =1

Provided that some agents form adaptive expectations (θ > 0), inflation in period t
is built into expectations of inflation for period t+1 and beyond. Monetary authorities
choose inflation to balance their current and future inflation and output objectives.
The first-order condition with respect to πt, using certainty equivalence, yields:
(9)

βθ 2 E t π t +1 − (1 + α + βθ 2 )π t + (1 − θ ) E t −1π t + θπ t −1 = −(1 − βθ )k − u t
Then taking expectations of both sides of (9) as of time t-1 and collecting terms

yields the following difference equation:
(10)

1
α + θ + βθ 2
k
E t-1 π t+1 E t-1 π t +
πt-1 = -(1-βθ) 2
2
βθ
βθ
βθ
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As shown in the Appendix, the solution for (10) can be written:
(11)

Et −1π t = λ π t-1 + (1- λ) π

where λ (0 < λ < 1) is the smaller root of the characteristic equation and
(12)
3.

π = (1 − βθ )

k

α

Inflation Dynamics
In the absence of future shocks, inflation is expected to gradually approach a long-

run equilibrium level of π . Note that π will be lower the higher the proportion (θ) of
naïve agents. The effect is magnified if the central bank places more weight on the
expected value of its future losses as indicated by greater values for β. Intuitively, naïve
agents have a “disciplining” effect on the central bank when it considers raising inflation
to realize short-run output gains. Higher current inflation is built into the expectations of
naïve agents and, thus, implies greater future expected losses to the central bank.5 Also,
from (12), long-run inflation decreases in the resolve of the monetary authorities to fight
inflation (higher α) and increases in the magnitude of their output objectives (higher k).
The λ parameter is shown in the Appendix to be:

(13)

λ=

α + θ + βθ 2 − (α + θ + βθ 2 ) 2 − 4 βθ 3
2 βθ 2

The anticipated speed of adjustment toward the long run inflation rate is given by (1- λ)
or, put differently, the degree of persistence in inflation is given by λ. We are interested

Note that without naive agents (θ=0) or with a myopic policymaker (β=0), long run inflation is k/α, the
solution to a one-period Barro-Gordon problem. This result is similar to earlier papers where the existence
of a “punishment mechanism” or credibility considerations support lower steady state inflation compared to
the one-shot game. See for example Barro-Gordon (1983b) and Rogoff (1987).
5
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in the effect of the resolve of the central bank to fight inflation (α), the discount factor
(β), and the proportion of naïve agents (θ) on this inflation persistence.
First, note that λ is a decreasing function of α. The greater the relative weight that
the central bank puts on inflation in its objective function, the more rapidly it will try to
bring down inflation to the long-run level, as well as having a lower long-run inflation
target.
A similar intuition applies to the fact that λ is a decreasing function of β. If the
monetary authority puts relatively more weight on future losses, it wants to get high
inflation out of the system more quickly.
We also find that λ is generally an increasing function of θ. A higher proportion
of naïve agents slows down the speed of adjustment and adds to the persistence of
inflation. This result, coupled with the effect of θ on the long-run inflation rate, gives rise
to a tradeoff for the central bank between rapid disinflation and lower long-run inflation.6
This is discussed more fully below.
Next we consider briefly how responsive the monetary authority in this framework
is to a supply shock. As shown in the Appendix, current inflation is:
(14)

π t = λπ t −1 + (1 − λ )π +

1 − βλ 2

1 + α − βλ 2 + βθ 2 (1 − λ )

2

ut

The coefficient on u t is unambiguously positive, so that a negative shock to output will
call for an increase in inflation. How large that response will be depends on the

Numerical analysis indicates that when β is high, λ as a function of θ may reach a peak at high values of θ
and then decrease slightly. Intuitively, with high β, the costs in future periods from not reducing inflation
now may outweigh the persistence effect of marginally higher θ.

6
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parameters α, β, and θ. A greater proportion of naïve agents will generally decrease the
inflation response to a supply shock as high current inflation is built into future
expectations.
4.

Preferences of the central bank over the distribution of agents.
We now address the question about whether the central bank with a mandate to

generate disinflation has any preference regarding the distribution of agents in the two
groups -- with rational and with adaptive expectations at the time it introduces the new
policy. In particular, the bank may choose to engage in more or less dissemination of
information about the features and implications of the new regime. Formally, ignoring
any current supply shock, we write the objective function as (see Appendix):

Wt = [π t − (λ − λθ + θ )π t −1 − (1 − λ )(1 − θ )π t − k ] + απ t2 +
2

(12)

∞

{[

]

[

+ ∑ β j θ (λ − 1)λ j −1 (π t − π ) − k + α λ j π t + (1 − λ j )π
j =1

2

]}
2

We are interested in what value of θ minimizes (12) given the bank’s preferences,
reflected in the α, β and k parameters, and the prior level of inflation π t-1 .
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show three examples in which the objective function (12) is
calculated for θ in the interval between 0 and 1. In all examples β = 0.9, α = 0.2 and k =
1, so that new long term-inflation in the absence of naïve agents (with θ = 0) would be 5.7
We calculated the objective function with three different values for π t-1 chosen to proxy
for high, moderate and low inflation. In Figure 1, π t-1 = 30 (high compared to equilibrium
inflation with no naïve agents), in Figure 2, π t-1 = 15 (“moderate” but still higher than

7

Steady state inflation with rational agents equal to 5 is the same as the Nash equilibrium inflation in
Sargent (1999, page 84). Replacing rational with adaptive expectations and with a discount factor of .97,
Sargent (1999) reports equilibrium inflation of 1.57. In our calibrations, with θ = 1, i.e., only adaptive
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equilibrium inflation with no naïve agents), and in Figure 3, π t-1 = 5 (equal to equilibrium
inflation with no naïve agents).
When authorities want to minimize the objective function (12), the figures deliver
an ambiguous message that it depends on where the economy starts. Figure 1 indicates
that if the economy starts at a very high inflation rate, the objective function is minimized
by having very few naive agents. This is because with very few naive agents substantial
progress can be made early in bringing down inflation and those early declines outweigh
the costs of higher long-run inflation. In this case, there should be a lot of information
about the new regime so that more agents can more rationally take into account how the
regime will achieve a disinflation.
At the other extreme if initial inflation is already fairly low, the objective function
is minimized by having a high proportion of naive agents as depicted in Figure 3. In that
case, the gains in reducing long-run inflation outweigh the loss in bringing inflation down
less rapidly, and the authorities may want to withhold information hoping that most
agents will form their expectations as a simple extrapolation of what has been most
recently observed. The intermediate case, as in Figure 2, suggests that with moderate
initial inflation the optimal solution is to have a mix of both naive and rational agents.
5.

Discussion.
A stylized fact about inflation stabilization has been a pattern of rapid declines in

inflation from high to moderate levels but slow convergence from moderate to low levels.
In fact, the episodes of rapid disinflation documented by Sargent (1982) are explained by
rational expectations, while the episodes of real exchange-rate appreciation summarized
expectations, α = 0.2, k = 1, and with a discount factor of 0.9, steady state inflation is 0.5. If we use
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by Calvo and Vegh (1994) are often explained by persistence in expectations. In our
variation of the Barro-Gordon model, when the central bank initiates a new disinflation
policy, more informed (rational) agents are desirable because they increase the rate of
disinflation but are undesirable to the extent that they contribute later to a stubborn
persistence of lower inflation when output targets exceed the natural rate of output.
These implications suggest that a central bank faced with the task of disinflating
from a high rate of inflation would want to provide substantial information about the new
disinflation policy at its inception and then gradually withdraw from public discussion as
inflation declines. This appears to be what has been happening in Bulgaria. At the
introduction of the Bulgarian currency board, policymakers were engaged significantly in
explaining how a currency board works and what it has done for other countries. Once
inflation was lower, policymakers began instead referring to the track record with low
inflation rather than explaining how low inflation comes about or what policies it has at
its disposal. As we pointed out earlier, a possible reason is that the design of the currency
board in Bulgaria, as that of most other currency boards, allows some discretion over
monetary policy. One example is the facilities for liquidity to the banking system.
Understanding of the balance sheet of the central bank may raise concerns and,
respectively, expected inflation on the part of rational agents.
In terms of the model, one could argue that, if the distribution of agents is a choice
variable for the central bank in each period, such information should be incorporated in
the expectations of rational agents. A switch in the extent of information from more to
less over time, if anything however, helps the disinflation policy. This is because rational

Sargent’s discount factor of .97, steady state inflation is 0.15.
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agents who anticipate that there will be relatively more naïve agents in the future will
expect inflation to fall even more than if there were no change in the proportions of naïve
and rational agents.

12
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Appendix
In the absence of any shocks, the first-order condition can be written as the following
second-order difference equation:
(A.1)

π t+1 -

1
α + θ + βθ 2
k
πt +
π t-1 = -(1-βθ) 2
2
βθ
βθ
βθ

or in lag-operator notation:
(A.2)

(1-λ 1 L)(1- λ 2 L)π t+1 = -(1-βθ)

k

βθ 2

where λ 1 and λ 2 are the roots of the characteristic equation
(A.3)

f(λ) = (λ - λ 1 )(λ - λ 2 ) = λ2 -

1
α + θ + βθ 2
λ+
=0
2
βθ
βθ

Note that
1

(A.4)

f(0) =

(A.5)

f(1) = (1 - λ 1 )(1 - λ 2 ) = -

βθ

>0

α
<0
βθ 2

These imply that the smaller root lies between 0 and 1 and the larger root is greater than
1. The smaller root can be written explicitly as

(A.6)

α + θ + βθ 2 − (α + θ + βθ 2 ) 2 − 4 βθ 3
λ1 =
2 βθ 2

One can use (A.4) and (A.5) to show that an increase in α, with 0 < θ < 1, lowers λ 1 . A
numerical analysis establishes that an increase in β also lowers λ 1 .
If one multiplies (A.2) through by (1 - λ 2 L)-1, the result assuming no bubbles is:
(1-λ 1 L) π t+1 =

1 − βθ k
λ 2 − 1 βθ 2

Then after substituting for (λ 2 -1) from (A.5):
(A.7)

π t+1 = λ π t + (1-λ) π

16

where λ = λ 1 and
(A.8)

π = (1-βθ)

k

.

α

(A.7) also implies that
(A.9)

E t-1 π t = λ π t-1 + (1-λ) π and

(A.10)

E t π t+n = π + λn (π t − π )

Given the quadratic objective function, we can use certainty equivalence and rewrite the
objective function as:

min π t Wt = [π t − (1 − θ )E t −1π t − θπ t −1 − k − u t ] + απ t2
2

(A.11)

∞

∞

i =1

i =1

+ ∑ β i [θE t π t + i − θE t π t + i −1 − k ] 2 + α ∑ β i E t π t2+ i

Substituting from (A.9) and (A.10) into (A.11), we have:

Wt = [π t − (λ − λθ + θ )π t −1 − (1 − λ )(1 − θ )π t − k − u t ] + απ t2 +
2

(A.12)

{[

∞

]

[

+ ∑ β j θ (λ − 1)λ j −1 (π t − π ) − k + α λ j π t + (1 − λ j )π
j =1

2

]}
2

Take the derivative of W t with respect to π t and set it equal to zero:
∂Wt / ∂π t = 2[π t − (λ − λθ + θ )π t −1 − (1 − λ )(1 − θ )π − k − u t ] + 2απ t +
(A.13)

∞

+ ∑β
j =1

j

{[θ (λ

j

]

[

]

− λ j −1 )(π t − π ) − k θ ( λ j − λ j −1 ) + α λ j π t + (1 − λ j )π λ j } = 0

Differentiate (A.13) totally with respect to π t and u t to see how the optimal π t varies in
response to u t . As a result we have:
∂π t
1 − βλ2
=
(A.14)
∂ut (1 − βλ2 )(1 + α ) + αβλ2 + βθ 2 (1 − λ ) 2
Hence,
(A.15)

π t = λ1π t −1 + (1 − λ1 )π +

1 − βλ 2
1 + α − βλ 2 + βθ 2 (1 − λ )

2

ut
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